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First Generation 1923-May 1928 White Terror                  
Zhu De's Reorganization
Second Generation June 1928-November 1931 Nationalist Threat              
Communist Response
Third Generation December 1931-December 1936 Military Role                  
Civil-Military Relations
Fourth Generation January 1937-December 1940 Recruitment in North China       
Geographical Focus
Fifth Generation January 1941-August 1945 Decentralized Military Operations  
New Military Role
Sixth Generation September 1945-October 1950 Civil War
Seventh Generation October 1950-September 1954 Chinese People's Volunteers in 
North Korea
Eight Generation October 1954-September 1959 Professionalization of Regular PLA
Ninth Generation October 1959-December 1963 Sino-Soviet Conflict             
PLA Rectification Campaign
Tenth Generation January 1964-December 1966 Ascendance of Commissars       
Learn from the PLA Movement
Eleventh Generation January 1967-March 1979* Sino-Soviet Conflict             
Sino-Vietnam War
Twelfth Generation April 1979-June 1989* Modernization                
Tiananmen
Table 2.1 Summary of Whitson and Huang's (1973) Military Generations
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Year Party Sec'y or Chairman Potential Challenger/Successor
1921 Chen Duxiu not stated
1928 Qu Qiubai |
1929 Xiang Zhongfa |
1932 Qin Bangxian |
1935 Zhang Wentian Mao Zedong
1943 Mao Zedong Liu Shaoqi
1967 | Lin Biao
1972 | Hua Guofeng
1977 Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping
1982 Hu Yaobang |
1987 Zhao Ziyang |
1990 Jiang Zemin |
1995 | Hu Jintao
2003 Hu Jintao Zeng Qinghong
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Table 5.1 Paramount Leaders and Potential Competitors
Paramount Leader Potential Competitor
Chen Duxiu Mao Zedong
| Zhang Guotao
Li Lisan Mao Zedong
Chen Shaoyu Mao Zedong






Hu Jintao Zeng Qinghong
| Wu Bangguo
Hua Guofeng Deng Xiaoping
Deng Xiaoping Chen Yun






















































































































































































௉ܸ௅೟ ൌ ܥ௉௅೟ െ ܥ௉௅೟షభ 
Equation 5. Rate of change of the paramount leader’s centrality. 
183 The formal definition is presented in Equation 6. 
























































































































Type Characteristics CC-Year VPL VC VCC Outcomes/Policies
1 Elite Consensus 1997 "Talk about politics"
Civil Society +16.0% +2.6% +2.0% CSOs Emerge
Cooperative FP Return of Hong Kong
2 Collective Leadership 1978 Deng's Rehabilitation
Modest Reforms +0.22% -0.08% +0.53% Four Modernizations
Selective Engagement Normalization
3 Rectifications 1982 Three Categories of People
Tightening -8.39% +0.35% -4.84% Emphasis on Ideology and 
Shou  Policies
Isolationism Anti-Spiritual Pollution
4 Purges 1969 Lin-Jiang Split
Mass Campaigns -21.98% -19.68% -6.83% Cultural Revolution
Coercive Foreign Policy Sino-Soviet Border Conflict





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The pair‐wise correlation coefficient between  ஼ܸ  and  ஼ܸ஼  is 0.412 and is significant. This suggests a positive 
correlation with moderate magnitude. As the competitor’s centrality increases, the Central Committee’s 












Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent Variables
Sino-US 8.995 0.951 6.5 10.18 31
Sino-USSR 7.703 1.648 4.45 9.82 31
Sino-Indian 8.449 1.736 4.6 10.6 31
Sino-ROC 10.9 1.936 7.29 14.86 31
Sino-Int'l 8.003 1.28 6.7 13.4 31
Independent Variables
VPL -0.272 5.173 -21.98 14.18 31
VC -0.441 5.605 -19.87 8.81 31
VCC -0.228 1.426 -6.83 2.13 31
Clustering 0.736 0.028 0.706 0.781 31
Distance 1.849 0.338 1.447 2.373 31
Compactness 0.602 0.096 0.445 0.699 31
Control Variables
Military Spending 9.9 18.176 -32 69 31
GDP Growth 6.684 9.422 -27.3 21.3 31
US-Sino 8.208 1.363 5.56 10.84 31
USSR-Sino 7.32 1.628 4.71 9.83 31
Indian-Sino 8.292 1.464 6 10.67 31
ROC-Sino 10.552 1.345 8.17 13.22 31
Table 7.1 Summary Descriptive Statistics (COPDAB), 1949-1978
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Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent Variables
Sino-US 0.887 0.687 0 2.26 12
Sino-USSR 0.384 0.513 0 1.4 12
Sino-Indian 0.446 0.997 0 3.4 12
Sino-ROC 1.501 0.747 0.36 2.73 12
Sino-Int'l 1.817 0.083 1.65 1.93 12
Independent Variables
VPL 2.127 6.702 -3.64 19 12
VC 1.125 8.731 -7 27.84 12
VCC 0.762 1.496 -0.27 3.95 12
Clustering 0.809 0.021 0.757 0.849 12
Distance 2.165 0.186 1.762 2.353 12
Compactness 0.514 0.049 0.456 0.625 12
Control Variables
Military Spending 13.042 6.535 6.2 29.2 12
GDP Growth 10.692 3.693 3.8 15.2 12
US-Sino 0.792 0.517 0.07 1.64 12
USSR-Sino 0.524 0.534 0 1.54 12
India-Sino 0.434 0.895 0 3 12
ROC-Sino 1.329 0.876 0 3.14 12






















































































































































































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL -0.134** -0.023† -0.040** -0.047** -0.134*
(0.049) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.061)
VC -0.055* -0.022 -0.028* -0.027* -0.048*













Intercept 9.044** 6.195 11.967** 5.334** 8.915**
(0.176) (4.717) (0.967) (1.076) (0.244)
N 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.124 0.044 0.352 0.383 0.159
F 14.49* 9.43** 8.17** 6.84** 12.98*
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed tests


















































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL 0.127** 0.151* 0.157* 0.161* 0.146*
(0.024) (0.055) (0.064) (0.065) (0.053)
VC -0.135** -0.153† -0.159 -0.165 -0.074













Intercept 0.830** 9.671 -1.088 2.676 1.585
(0.239) (13.172) (2.882) (2.755) (1.339)
N 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.237 0.269 0.274 0.273 0.361
F 1328.75** 29.83** 35.83** 39.59** 47.60**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test




























Daily;  “Government Statement: Sino‐Soviet Border Disputes.”  (May 1969).  In Peking Review; and  “Kung Chung‐























































































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL -0.002 -0.143** -0.098* -0.083* 0.000
(0.113) (0.047) (0.039) (0.039) (0.114)
VC 0.077 0.077† -0.056 0.052 0.063













Intercept 7.614** 28.018** 1.967† 14.441** 7.909**
(0.270) (6.781) (1.131) (1.304) (0.368)
N 31 31 31 31 31
Wald X 2 7.09† 15.98** 36.23** 37.68** 8.35
Note: XTGLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed tests
Sino-USSR Relations
Table 7.5 Baseline Regressions for Sino-USSR Relations (Network Variables Only)(COPDAB), 1949-1978
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL 0.010 0.090† 0.146* 0.139† 0.018
(0.017) (0.043) (0.057) (0.061) (0.040)
VC -0.042 -0.159† -0.200* -0.200* 0.057













Intercept 0.509* 5.494 -4.431* 4.221† -1.727*
(0.205) (7.338) (1.742) (2.130) (0.651)
N 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.201 0.203 0.460 0.373 0.527
F 3.950† 2.15 3.14† 2.64 2.18
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test































































centralization show that  ௉ܸ௅,  ஼ܸ, and  ஼ܸ஼  are not statistically significant (Table 7.7, column a). In 




















































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL -0.040 -0.104** 0.071* -0.064** -0.050
(0.121) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.117)
VC 0.002 0.026 0.001 -0.004 -0.025













Intercept 8.389** 26.867* 5.071* 12.041** 8.940**
-0.351 (9.824) (1.937) (2.063) (0.428)
N 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.079 0.206 0.188 0.179 0.218
F 11.89** 12.82** 10.17** 9.80** 10.77**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed tests
Sino-India Relations






















































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL 0.063* 0.127* 0.132† 0.148† 0.076†
(0.025) (0.052) (0.059) (0.063) (0.035)
VC 0.254** 0.186* 0.178* 0.161† 0.256**













Intercept 0.251 14.826 -2.659 3.623 0.284
(0.182) (11.115) (2.347) (2.612) (0.505)
N 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.884 0.908 0.907 0.918 0.889
F 4882.57** 893.38** 1414.02** 1611.77** 5543.41**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test
Sino-India Relations






























































centrality and centralization (Table 7.9, column a) suggests that   ௉ܸ௅,  ஼ܸ, and  ஼ܸ஼  are 
statistically significant. The F statistic is 8.94, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
The t statistic for  ௉ܸ௅ is 3.47 with a significance level of less than the 0.01 level. The t statistic 
for  ஼ܸ  is 2.64 with a significance level of less than the 0.05 level. The t statistic for  ஼ܸ஼  is 4.18 
with a significance level of less than the 0.01 level. The R2 value is low at 0.255 and the Root 
MSE is 1.762.240   







































centralization show that  ௉ܸ௅ and  ஼ܸ  are statistically significant (Table 7.10, column a). The F 
Variable:
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL -0.309** 0.062† 0.014 -0.005 -0.292**
(0.089) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.102)
VC -0.111* -0.018 -0.012 -0.009 -0.093*













Intercept 11.127** -5.210 18.097** 2.136† 10.730**
(0.338) (9.620) (1.150) (1.276) (0.441)
N 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.255 0.106 0.464 0.509 0.302
F 8.94** 5.52** 17.98** 18.31** 7.16**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed tests
Sino-ROC Relations
















































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL -0.243** -0.222** -0.288** -0.294** -0.265**
(0.350) (0.047) (0.061) (0.056) (0.043)
VC 0.296** -0.223* 0.286** 0.297** 0.171†













Intercept 1.400** -12.535† 7.905* -4.645† -0.147
(0.284) (5.781) (1.243) (2.155) (0.797)
N 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.289 0.444 0.533 0.548 0.534
F 378.54** 67.69** 103.39** 56.44** 188.88**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test
Sino-ROC Relations














































































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL -0.146** -0.014 -0.052** -0.058** -0.148*
(0.046) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.060)
VC -0.026 -0.032 -0.001 0.003 -0.022













Intercept 8.066** -12.829 11.795** 4.084** -7.979**
(0.250) (7.731) (1.463) (1.238) (0.351)
N 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.077 0.346 0.301 0.248 0.083
F 10.36** 7.20** 6.72** 5.97** 0.681**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed tests
Sino-International Relations














































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL 0.023** 0.031** 0.033** 0.033** 0.016**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
VC -0.018** -0.032** -0.032** -0.032** -0.019**













Intercept 1.832** 1.777 1.750** 1.890** 1.816**
(0.025) (2.164) (0.444) (0.397) (0.050)
N 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.655 0.635 0.637 0.636 0.875
F 2099.11** 95.61** 86.27** 89.58** 8277.05**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test
Sino-International Relations







relations (column b), the variables   ௉ܸ௅ and  ஼ܸ஼  are statistically significant. The F statistic is 
Variable Sino-US Sino-USSR Sino-India Sino-ROC Sino-Int' l
(a) (c) (c) (d) (e)
VPL 0.000 0.038 0.074 -0.216* -0.148*
(0.052) (0.044) (0.070) (0.088) (0.060)
VC 0.000 0.004 -0.033 0.013 -0.022
(0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.037) (0.021)
Vcc -0.137 -0.198 -0.228 0.900* 0.496†
(0.221) (0.179) (0.262) (0.397) (0.275)
Military Spending -0.008 0.010† -0.015 0.010 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013)
GDP Growth 0.002 -0.014 -0.013 -0.005 0.008









Intercept 3.664** 0.481 0.389 1.964 7.979**
(1.015) (0.581) (0.845) (1.859) (0.351)
N 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.736 0.789 0.558 0.083
F 11.18** 53.90** 26.47** 6.81**
Wald X 2 230.45**
Note: OLS and XTGLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed tests












Variable Sino-US Sino-USSR Sino-India Sino-ROC Sino-Int' l
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL 0.253 -0.032† 0.199 -0.550 0.047**
(0.609) (0.009) (0.071) (0.262) (0.002)
VC -0.157 0.013 0.074 0.564 -0.076**
(0.960) (0.027) (0.169) (0.402) (0.005)
Vcc 0.093 0.340** -0.033 -0.433 0.011**
(0.321) (0.015) (0.028) (0.168) (0.001)
Clustering -76.361 -7.394* 93.079 -3.978 33.319**
(203.594) (1.262) (77.544) (29.468) (2.313)
Distance -17.840 25.615** -25.759 30.949 5.032**
(26.604) (1.144) (12.223) (13.359) (0.362)
Compactness -48.609 91.148** -87.145 125.778 9.229**
(62.274) (3.998) (23.763) (51.494) (0.699)
Military Spendin -0.09 0.068* 0.008 0.078 0.013**
(0.067) (0.011) (0.030) (0.044) (0.001)
GDP Growth 0.036 0.110* 0.014 0.207 0.010*









Intercept 126.321 -98.158** 176.032 -129.706 -41.096**
(236.526) (5.124) (102.016) (57.963) (3.027)
N 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.482 0.996 0.995 0.902 0.998
F 25.35 5583.43** 16652.10** 36.85* 87307.24**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test

















Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent Variable
Domestic 1.128 0.385 0.5 1.77 12
Independent Variables
VPL 2.127 6.702 -3.64 19 12
VC 1.125 8.731 -7 27.84 12
VCC 0.762 1.496 -0.27 3.95 12
Clustering 0.809 0.021 0.757 0.849 12
Distance 2.165 0.186 1.762 2.353 12
Compactness 0.514 0.049 0.456 0.625 12
Control Variables
Military Spending 13.042 6.535 6.2 29.2 12
GDP Growth 10.692 3.693 3.8 15.2 12

































































































(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
VPL 0.095** 0.096* 0.098* 0.094† 0.073*
(0.022) (0.035) (0.041) (0.043) (0.028)
VC -0.102** 0.102† -0.103† -0.101 -0.069













Intercept 1.126** 2.084 0.864 1.127 1.524*
(0.146) (7.650) (1.693) (1.766) (0.544)
N 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.297 0.298 0.299 0.297 0.547
F 96.47** 32.16** 32.72** 29.93** 82.00**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test
Domestic Policy






















(BR) (RC) (BR) (RC) (BR) (RC) (BR) (RC) (BR) (RC)
VPL -0.134** -0.134* -0.002 0.000 -0.040 -0.050 -0.309** -0.292** -0.146** -0.148*
(0.049) (0.061) (0.113) (0.114) (0.121) (0.117) (0.089) (0.102) (0.046) (0.060)
VC -0.055* -0.048* 0.077 0.063 0.002 -0.025 -0.111* -0.093* -0.026 -0.022
(0.022) (0.022) (0.060) (0.061) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.044) (0.019) (0.021)
Vcc 0.481* 0.472† -0.536 -0.531 -0.201 -0.125 1.579** 1.483** 0.490* 0.496†
(0.221) (0.272) (0.449) (0.462) (0.505) (0.492) (0.378) (0.433) (0.205) (0.275)
Military Spending 0.008 -0.012 -0.032 0.023 0.003
(0.006) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013)
GDP Growth 0.010 -0.022 -0.033 0.017 -0.008
(0.017) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.016)
Intercept 9.044** 8.915** 7.614** 7.909** 8.389** 8.940** 11.127** 10.730** 8.066** -7.979**
(0.176) (0.244) (0.270) (0.368) -0.351 (0.428) (0.338) (0.441) (0.250) (0.351)
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
R2 0.124 0.159 0.079 0.218 0.255 0.302 0.077 0.083
F 14.49* 12.98* 11.89** 10.77** 8.94** 7.16** 10.36** 0.681**
Wald X 2 7.09† 8.35
Note: OLS and XTGLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed tests
Table 7.17 Summary of Baseline Regressions (BR) & Robustness Checks (RC) (COPDAB), 1949-1978





































(BR) (RC) (BR) (RC) (BR) (RC) (BR) (RC) (BR) (RC)
VPL 0.127** 0.146* 0.010 0.018 0.063* 0.076† -0.243** -0.265** 0.023** 0.016**
(0.024) (0.053) (0.017) (0.040) (0.025) (0.035) (0.350) (0.043) (0.002) (0.003)
VC -0.135** -0.074 -0.042 0.057 0.254** 0.256** 0.296** 0.171† -0.018** -0.019**
(0.038) (0.107) (0.035) (0.049) (0.039) (0.059) (0.064) (0.079) (0.004) (0.003)
Vcc -0.005 0.006 -0.121* -0.104† -0.047 -0.057 -0.057 -0.076 -0.014† -0.009
(0.060) (0.032) (0.205) (0.045) (0.079) (0.095) (0.090) (0.980) (0.006) (0.005)
Military Spending -0.042 -0.045 -0.015 0.069† 0.008†
(0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.003)
GDP Growth -0.027 -0.068 0.017 0.073 -0.008*
(0.116) (0.044) (0.036) (0.072) (0.003)
Intercept 0.830** 1.585 0.509* -1.727* 0.251 0.284 1.400** -0.147 1.832** 1.816**
(0.239) (1.339) (0.205) (0.651) (0.182) (0.505) (0.284) (0.797) (0.025) (0.050)
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.237 0.361 0.201 0.527 0.884 0.889 0.289 0.534 0.655 0.875
F 1328.75** 47.60** 3.950† 2.18 4882.57** 5543.41** 378.54** 188.88** 2099.11** 8277.05**
Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard deviations in parentheses. 
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1, two-tailed test
Sino-USSR Sino-India Sino-ROC Sino-Int' l
Table 7.18 Summary Baseline Regressions (BR) and Robustness Checks (RC) (PANDA), 1984-1995
Sino-US
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variable, except for GDP Growth, is significant at the one percent level. (GDP Growth is 
significant at the five percent level.) 
  Of all the models considered in the statistical analyses of China’s foreign policy choices, 
it is clear that the dynamical theory of policy networks has robust predictive value for Sino‐US, 
Sino‐ROC, and Sino‐International relations under conditions of strong paramount leaders—as 
was the case during the Mao era. When the conditions entail a more balanced power 
relationship between the paramount leader and the potential competitor, or there is a general 
sense of collective leadership, the dynamical theory has robust predictive value for Sino‐US, 
Sino‐Indian, Sino‐ROC, and Sino‐International relations—as was the case during the Deng era.  
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Chapter Eight. Conclusions 
  This study offers a new way of looking at Chinese political decision making. The 
application of social network analysis using Chinese conceptions of guanxi connections allows 
insights into China’s policymaking process. To be sure, there remain many aspects of China’s 
political system that seem mysterious. What is the substance of policy debates? To what extent 
do quid pro quo exchanges influence policy outcomes? The dynamical theory of policy networks 
used in this present study adds an important tool to understanding China’s political system, in 
particular, and policy networks in general.  
  The dynamical theory of policy networks posits, in general, that changes in a policy 
network’s structure influence the policy outcomes. Specifically, this study demonstrated the 
plausibility that changes in the network centrality of the paramount leader, his nearest 
potential competitor, and the Central Committee correlate well with the policy choices in the 
past. It is important to keep in mind that this study broadly followed a two‐step conceptual 
process. First, the paramount leader, his nearest potential competitor, and the Party’s policy 
choices were identified based on observations and documentation provided by China scholars. 
Second, the degrees of centrality for the leaders and the Central Committees were determined 
for each year. (The leaders and their nearest competitors were not chosen based on high 
degrees of centrality.)  
  Chapter Four discussed how the dynamical theory is constructed from network theory, 
Veto Player Theory, and Prospect Theory. The crux of the dynamical theory is the idea that 
changes in network centrality directly affect the policy network’s bargaining space. On one 
hand, increasing centrality among three key actors has the effect of enlarging the bargaining 
Chapter Eigh  ‐ Conclusions 
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space—thereby making a wider array of policy choices acceptable and increasing the 
probability of building broad consensus and finding compromise solutions. On the other hand, 
the decreasing centralities among all of the key actors in the model of China’s policy network 
result in a shrinking bargaining space. Fewer acceptable policy options leads to greater 
difficulties in gaining consensus and acting as a unified political party.  
  Chapter Six presented four case studies representing the four possible types of policy 
outcomes. Given certain configurations of changes of centrality for the paramount leader, the 
potential competitor, and the Central Committee, a certain set of policy outcomes is predicted. 
The case study of the Central Committee of 1997 demonstrated how changes in the policy 
network structure led to Type 1 policy outcomes (Elite Consensus, Civil Society, and 
Cooperative Foreign Policy). Measurable structural changes associated with the Central 
Committee of 1978 led to Type 2 policy choices (Collective Leadership, Modest Reforms, and 
Selective Engagement). Similarly, membership changes to the Central Committees of 1982 and 
1969 caused structural changes consistent with Type 3 outcomes (Rectifications, Tightening, 
and Isolationism) and Type 4 outcomes (Intra‐Party Purges, Mass Campaigns, and Coercive 
Foreign Policy), respectively.  
  The quantitative portion of the study, Chapter Seven, based on a unique data set 
capturing the guanxi connections among the Central Committee members from 1922 to 2011, 
adds a depth and breadth to our understanding of the Central Committee that was 
indeterminate until now. The network structure can be measured. The measures of centrality 
for the paramount leaders, their nearest potential competitors, and the entire Central 
Committee can be calculated. Year‐to‐year changes in centrality can be determined. The 
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dynamical theory, as suggested by the case studies and the statistical analyses, adds credibility 
to the dynamical explanation of the Party’s policy choices.  
The key independent variables (paramount leader, potential competitor, and Central 
Committee) are generally statistically significant with respect to China’s foreign and domestic 
policies. For the period 1949‐1978, the dynamical model explains, in part, China’s relations with 
the United States, Russia, India, and the Republic of China. The statistical significance of the 
dynamical model (F statistics) suggests that the null hypothesis (which suggests that the key 
independent variables have no relationship to policy outcomes) can be rejected with 
confidence. Similarly, China’s domestic policies during the period 1984‐1995 can be explained, 
in part, by variations in the degrees of centrality of the paramount leader, his nearest 
competitor, and the Central Committee. The dynamical theory may be said to be generalizable 
and, unlike Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) study, has predictive value.  
  Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010a, 2010b) concluded that from 1921 to 2007 the Party 
consolidated to a large degree around its formal leaders during the period of struggle and great 
expansion between 1931 and 1956. Among other things, the authors argued 1) that Mao’s 
influence in the Central Committee peaked in 1943, 2) Mao’s influence declined significantly at 
the Eighth Central Committee in 1956, and 3) the factions led by Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping 
gained significant influence in the Central Committee in 1956. This present study challenges 
many of their findings. 
  By using a more valid identification of the paramount leaders developed in Chapter Five 
of this study, I suggest that Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) conclusions are mistaken. If the Party’s 
Central Committee consolidated around the paramount leader from 1931 to 1956, then we 
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should see a general trend of the paramount leader’s centrality increasing, the potential 
competitor’s centrality decreasing, and the Central Committee becoming more centralized. 
Referring back to Figure 7.1, it is clearly apparent that the measures of centrality for all three 
key actors are trending upward from 1931 to 1956.  
  Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010a) equated “degree of centrality” with determinate political 
influence and power. They defined the Party Secretary General Influence (PSGI) indicator as a 
“novel” measure of “how influential the official heads of the CCP were in the CCP elite, as 
represented by the Central Committee, over time.” It is clear from their study that they 
intended to equate the “share of Central Committee members with ties with the Party 
Secretary or Chairman” with political “influence,” “dominance,” and indicative of the Party 
leader’s “core support base.” The definitions of “degree of centrality” (used in this study) and 
Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) PSGI are conceptually equivalent.  Where Shih, Shan, and Liu 
(2010a) had a decidedly deterministic interpretation of the utility of centrality, I have taken a 
more conservative approach in this study that considers guanxi ties as potentially important 
relationships.  
Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010a) made the assumption that “If a serving CC member shared at 
least one experience or characteristic with the Party Secretary General, that person is 
presumed to be a member of his faction.” Their assumption is clearly more deterministic than 
the assumption made in this present study (i.e. a tie is only an incipient or gateway relationship 
that can lead to the formation of cohesive subgroups.) Ironically, Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010a) 
quoted (and ignored) Lowell Dittmer’s warning that “an objective basis for an affinity does not 
necessarily create one.” 
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  Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) assertion that Mao’s influence peaked in 1943 is 
questionable. Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010a) stated, “[T]he head of the Party enjoyed a resounding 
lead over his rivals and influenced the vast majority of CC members between 1943 and 1945.” 
The temptation to assign the height of Mao’s power to the end of the Yanan Rectification is 
curious at best. Again referring to Figure 7.1 (blue line), it is clear that Mao’s measure of 
centrality actually peaked in 1965 at 53% just before the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s centrality 
dramatically fell after 1965. Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) conclusion that Mao’s power and 
influence flat‐lined or declined after 1943 is not compelling.  
  Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) conclusion that Mao’s influence fell precipitously in 1956 is 
also mistaken. They specifically wrote, “Although Mao held a dominant position in the Party for 
13 years (1943‐1956), his tight grip diminished at the Eighth [Party Congress] and further 
deteriorated into the Cultural Revolution.” I found, however, that Mao’s measure of centrality 
actually climbed significantly from 37% in 1955 to 51% in 1956. In fact, this present study 
showed Mao’s measure of centrality rose steadily from 1935 to 1965 (Figure 7.1). According to 
my results, Mao’s network connections within the Central Committee dropped dramatically 
from 53% in 1965 to 23% in 1969. As discussed in the case study in Chapter Six, 1969 was a 
significant year.  
  Finally, Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) finding that Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping’s factions 
gained influence at the Eighth Central Committee of 1956 is curious. Recalling that in 1956, 
Peng Dehuai was Mao’s nearest potential competitor, the model presented in this study 
suggests that Lin and Deng’s measures of centrality have little importance to the Central 
Committee’s policy preferences. Nevertheless, Lin Biao’s measure of centrality fell from 74% in 
263 
 
1955 to 45% in 1956. Similarly, Deng Xiaoping’s measure of centrality was nearly halved, falling 
from 42% in 1955 to 23% in 1956.  
  Keeping in mind that their data is not available for inspection, the mistaken conclusions 
made by Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010a) can be attributed to three methodological errors. First, in 
their study the importance of Central Committee members is determined with regard to only 
their individual guanxi ties to Mao. As this present study showed, people live within intricate 
webs of relationships—webs that connect them to all others in the network. Ignoring “all 
others” cannot produce a valid data set.  
  Second, Shih, Shan, and Liu (2010a) kept a myopic focus on the formal leader—that is, 
the Party leader. Although such an approach would be appropriate from 1935 to 1976 when 
Mao was in command, it is not a valid model in general. As discussed in Chapter Five, the 
paramount leader is not always the formal leader. Basing conclusions on the assumption that 
the formal leader and the informal leader are always the same person misrepresents reality.  
  Finally, Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) study is not substantive.  If Mao’s influence fell at 
the Eighth Central Committee of 1956, then “so what?” The authors did not clearly develop 
what the implications of the Party leader’s declining influence are. The somewhat trivial 
conclusions made by Shih, Shan, and Liu’s (2010a) research are a consequence of analysis not 
being based in theory. Consequently, their study only serves as an introduction, of sorts, to the 
potential uses of social network analysis methods for studying real world policy networks.  
  This study and the dynamical theory of policy networks are not the last word on 
policymaking in China’s Central Committee. Social network analysis is an extremely 
sophisticated branch of social science and this study took advantage of the most fundamental 
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(and simple) concepts. Do changes in the network structure influence collective behavior other 
than policymaking? How might cliques wield their power and influence? What other socio‐
metrics are important? 
  Looking further afield, we should ask if the dynamical theory is applicable to other states 
with Sinic cultures such as Taiwan and Singapore. Is the theory valid for other Asian states? We 
should also investigate whether changes in policy network structures influence policy outcomes 
in other regime types as Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011) asserted in their recent study of 
political behavior.  
  The results of the four case studies and the quantitative analyses strongly suggest that 
the paramount leader, his nearest potential competitor, and the Central Committee as a whole 
are key actors in determining policies at the intra‐Party, domestic, and foreign policy levels. 
More precisely, changes in their measures of degree of centrality are plausible indicators of the 
Central Committee’s policy outcomes.     
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